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The US introduced the cartel leniency program in 1978. In the past 
two decades, there has been a surge in the implementation of 
leniency programs in more than sixty jurisdictions. Although there 
have been numerous scholarly discussions to support the cartel 
leniency program, inconsistent views exist among different 
jurisdictions and stakeholders as to the effectiveness of the leniency 
program in practice. In evaluating new leniency programs, scholars 
and commentators have typically referred to the US and the EU 
models as benchmarks, but little attention has been paid to the 
question of whether it is desirable to apply these models in 
designing various leniency programs in different jurisdictions and 
societies. Given that Australia has recently revised its cartel 
immunity program for the third time, and that China’s competition 
authorities have proactively relied on the leniency concept to 
combat cartels in the past few years and are currently drafting a 
guideline for more effective implementation of the cartel leniency 
program, the time is now ripe for an apple-versus-pear comparison 
of these two immunity/leniency programs so as to provide more 
insights into the different institutional designs of immunity/leniency 
programs.  
I  Immunity/leniency Program in Competition Law 
Cartel leniency programs, otherwise known as amnesty programs or 
immunity programs, 1  are an incentive-based mechanism used by 
competition authorities to combat cartels. These programs aim to 
destabilise cartels and to erode the collusion between cartel members by 
providing immunity from governmental penalties to cartel members who 
                                                          
  PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia. 
   Professor in Law, School of Law, Nanjing University, China. 
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1  In some jurisdictions, ‘amnesty’ or ‘immunity’ means exemption from punishment, while 
‘leniency’ refers to both the exemption from punishment and the partial reduction in 
punishment. In this article, the terms ‘immunity policy’ and/or ‘immunity program’ are used 
only in the Australian context, and the term ‘leniency program’ is used mainly to describe the 
corresponding regimes in China, the US and the EU and in certain discussion settings to 
include the Australian cartel immunity program or policy.  
 
come forward to report cartel conduct.2 Compared with the long history of 
modern competition law, leniency programs are still in their infancy, but 
they are expected by competition authorities to play a more significant role 
in tackling cartel issues in the future.3 Initially established in 1978, the US 
leniency program had not been very effective until 1993, when the US 
Department of Justice (‘USDOJ’) made a significant revision to the old 
program to provide the leniency applicants with more incentives to 
cooperate.4 Between 1978 and 1993, only 17 leniency applications were 
made in the US — roughly one application every year — while the 
application rate from 1993 to 2003 averaged more than one application per 
month. 5  Possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of the original US 
Leniency Program include the less severe sanctions in cartel law,6 the broad 
discretion afforded to antitrust enforcers,7 and the lack of transparency.8 
The revised leniency program introduced in the US in 1993, which was 
renamed the Corporate Leniency Policy,9 is generally regarded as a very 
effective tool in the detection and deterrence of cartel conduct.10 Statistical 
evidence also indicates that the US leniency program is effective in 
achieving its objectives.11  
                                                          
2  Joseph E Harrington Jr, ‘Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs’ (2008) 56(2) Journal of 
Industrial Economics 215, 215. 
3  Gönenç Gürkaynak, K Korhan Yildirim and E Açelya Setkaya, ‘Granting Immunity and 
Revoking Immunity: A Global Overview of Leniency Programs’ (2014) 25(6) International 
Company and Commercial Law Review 195. 
4  In comparison to the voluminous literature on the US Corporate Leniency Policy (1993), less 
literature has been found on the ineffectiveness of the US Leniency Program (1978).  
Regarding the ineffectiveness of the 1978 US Leniency Program, see Christopher R Leslie, 
‘Editorial — Antitrust Leniency Programmes’ (2011) 7(2) Competition Law Review 175, 175. 
5  See, eg, Nathan H Miller, ‘Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement’ (2009) 99(3) American 
Economic Review 750, 752; James M Griffin, ‘The Modern Leniency Program After Ten 
Years: A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program’ 
(Speech delivered at the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Annual Meeting, 
San Francisco, 12 August 2003) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201477.pdf>. 
6  See Scott D Hammond, ‘The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two 
Decades’ (Speech delivered at the 24th Annual Meeting of the National Institute on White 
Collar Crimes, Miami, 25 February 2010) (‘The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust 
Enforcement ’) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf>. 
7  See Leslie, ‘Antitrust Leniency Programmes’, above n 4, 175. 
8  See Michel Cloutier, Three Essays on Leniency Policies (PhD Thesis, Queen’s University, 
Canada, 2014) 51 <http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/12378/3/Cloutier_ 
Michel_201408_PhD.pdf>. 
9 United States Department of Justice (‘USDOJ’), Corporate Leniency Policy (10 August 1993) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.htm>. 
10  See, eg, Daniel A Crane, ‘Technocracy and Antitrust’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 1159, 
1186; Leslie, ‘Antitrust Leniency Programmes’, above n 4; Gary R Spratling, ‘Detection and 
Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations’ (2001) 69 George Washington 
Law Review 798, 799. 
11 From 1995 to 2010, companies were fined over $5 billion for antitrust crimes, of which over 
90 percent was attributable to the assistance of the leniency applicants under investigation. 
The USDOJ usually has 50 international cartel investigations open at a time, and more than 
half of these investigations are initiated based on the information from the leniency 
applications. See Hammond, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, above n 6. 
 
The first European leniency policy, the Commission Notice on the Non-
Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases,12 was inspired by the US 
leniency program and adopted by the European Commission in 1996. Since 
that time, the European Commission has twice revised the relevant rules to 
better combat cartels. 13  It has been claimed that the leniency program 
adopted by the EU is equally as successful as its US counterpart. 14 
Encouraged by the purported success in the US and the EU, more than 60 
cartel leniency regimes have been established around the globe since 
2011.15  
While the proliferation of leniency programs appears to correspond to 
competition law enforcers’ preference for such policies, their real 
effectiveness is difficult to assess. This is especially so because different 
jurisdictions have different level of market openness and different 
understandings of market competition, and, hence, different perceptions of 
the appropriate penalties in cartel law. 16  Until now, empirical studies 
undertaken to investigate the effectiveness of leniency or immunity 
programs in different jurisdictions appear to produce mixed results, no 
matter whether those different leniency programs have much in common 
in terms of their institutional design. For example, while empirical studies 
of the US leniency program usually confirm that it has been effective in 
detecting and deterring cartels since 1993,17 some earlier empirical studies 
of the EU leniency program do not confirm a positive relationship between 
the adoption of that program and the level of cartel detection and 
deterrence.18 One reason for these different results may be that the US 
leniency program is supported by criminal penalties, whereas the EU 
leniency program is not. 19  Another possible reason for the apparent 
                                                          
12  Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases [1996] OJ 
C 207/4. 
13  The European Commission reformed twice its leniency notice twice, in 2002 and 2006, 
respectively. See Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in 
Cartel Cases [2002] OJ C 45/3; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction 
of Fines in Cartel Cases [2006] OJ C 298/11. 
14  The European Commission is said to receive two leniency applications every month on 
average. See Grant Murray, ‘European Union’ in Samantha J Mobley and Ross Denton (eds), 
Global Cartels Handbook: Leniency: Policy and Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
188, 188. It has also been reported that the EU Leniency Notice had yielded 31 cases with 
over €6 billion fines as of April 2007. See Andreas Stephan, ‘An Empirical Assessment of the 
European Leniency Notice’ (2008) 5(3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 537, 539 
(‘An Empirical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice ’). 
15  Samantha J Mobley and Ross Denton, ‘Introduction: The Race for Leniency: Solving the 
Global Puzzle’ in Samantha J Mobley and Ross Denton (eds), Global Cartels Handbook: 
Leniency: Policy and Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2011) lxxxv, lxxxv. 
16  Gordon J Klein, ‘Cartel Destabilization and Leniency Programs — Empirical Evidence’ 
(Discussion Paper No 10-107, Centre for European Economic Research, December 21 2010) 
<ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10107.pdf>. 
17  See, eg, Miller, above n 5, 750, 765. 
18     See, eg, Stephan, ‘An Empirical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice’, above n 14, 
539, 558–9; Andreas Stephan, ‘Cartels’ in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds), 
Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects (Edward Elgar, 2013) 217, 
229–30; Steffen Brenner, ‘An Empirical Study of the European Corporate Leniency Program’ 
(2009) 27 International Journal of Industrial Organization 639, 639, 645. 
19  See Brenner, above n 18, 645. 
 
ineffectiveness of the EU leniency is that immunity is available only to the 
first leniency applicant.20 It may be argued, then, that if the main features 
of the US leniency program were transposed into the programs adopted in 
the EU and other jurisdictions, similar levels of effectiveness would be 
more likely. This argument seems to be supported by a recent study of the 
European situation, since the European 2006 Leniency Notice is said to be 
much more in line with the US leniency program.21 However, even if the 
new EU leniency program is effective, this does not necessarily mean that 
a model leniency program based on the US and EU model would be readily 
adaptable to other jurisdictions. Neither does it necessarily mean a 
seemingly successful model of leniency program in one jurisdiction would 
be successful in other jurisdictions. The purpose of this paper is to conduct 
further studies of the adoption of leniency policies in jurisdictions other 
than the US and the EU to ascertain the function of leniency program as an 
anti-cartel instrument and whether it is desirable to transplant all or most 
of the features of a purportedly successful model in designing a leniency 
program.22  
Australia and China both introduced immunity/leniency programs to 
their competition law regimes based on the US and EU experiences. In 
terms of institutional design, the Australian immunity program displays 
more features of the US leniency program, whereas the Chinese leniency 
program displays more features of the EU program. Moreover, while the 
Australian immunity program has been defined and widely recognised as a 
cartel leniency program, the Chinese leniency program has not yet been 
clearly defined as a cartel leniency program, either at home or by the 
international community.23 For these reasons, it may be argued that this 
article sets out to compare an apple with a pear, and that no meaningful 
comparisons can be drawn between the Australian and Chinese programs. 
However, a closer examination of the institutional designs and practical 
applications of the Australian and Chinese programs reveals that both have 
                                                          
20  See Stephan, An Empirical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice, above n 14, 559–
60. 
21  See Wouter P J Wils, ‘The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment After 
Twenty Years’ (2016) World Competition 317, 331–5, 350–2. However, this study has also 
expressed the view that the success of a cartel leniency program relies heavily on the level of 
credibility of the competition enforcement authorities to detect and punish cartel 
infringements on its own. 
22 Especially with regard to the assessment of leniency program in combating cartels, more 
comparative study on the newly implemented leniency/immunity programs has been called 
for. See Pariz Lythgo-Marshall, The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A Critical Legal Analysis (PhD Thesis, University of 
Wollongong, 2016) 335. 
23  For example, Nate Bush contends that the leniency provisions of the Chinese Antimonopoly 
law are more an extension of general principles of Chinese law than an adoption of foreign 
antitrust leniency or amnesty program. See Nate Bush, ‘Weathervanes, Lightning Rods, and 
Pliers: The NDRC’s Competition Enforcement Program’ (2014) The Antitrust Source 1, 6. 
Some Chinese commentators also hold the similar views, see, eg, 吴汉洪，孙耀祖 [Wu 
Hankong, Sun Yaozu], «反垄断领域中的宽大政策：实践、理论及中国的对策思考» 
[Leniency Policy in Antitrust: Practice, Theory and Thoughts on China] (2010) 4 中国人民
大学学报 Journal of Renmin University of China 85, 90. 
 
been instituted to detect and deter anticompetitive cartel behaviour. 
Although they are at different stages of their development, a comparative 
analysis of these programs may foster a better understanding of each 
program, which may prove especially important given the expanding 
business cooperation between these two countries. Moreover, just as the 
competition policies and laws of Australian and China have been 
influenced to varying degrees by US antitrust and EU competition 
regulatory regimes, Australia and China have adopted immunity/leniency 
programs that display US and EU characteristics, respectively. Therefore, 
a comparison of the Australian and Chinese immunity/leniency programs 
will also provide views in addition to those offered in the context of the 
US-EU programs as to the function of leniency program as an anti-cartel 
tool.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the 
commonly recognised rationale behind, and the key features of, the 
leniency program. Section 3 then critically highlights the development of, 
and the main elements of, the immunity/leniency programs in Australia and 
China. Having set the scene, Section 4 compares the two 
immunity/leniency programs against the commonly recognised benchmark 
of designing immunity/leniency programs. Section 5 concludes and makes 
recommendations on the institution and improvement of the leniency 
programs in other jurisdictions. 
II  Rationale and Key Features of an Effective 
Immunity/Leniency Program 
Nowadays, cartels are universally regarded as the most harmful of 
anticompetitive practices with hardly any perceivable benefits to 
consumers.24 Although some scholars have argued that cartels may actually 
enhance welfare,25 many jurisdictions declare so-called hard-core cartels 
to be illegal per se.26 Cartels usually continue for years and are highly 
insidious. Hence, the detrimental impacts of cartels on consumer welfare 
are often long-term and extensive.27 Cartels are qualitatively different from 
other types of illegal market behaviour in that they often involve deliberate 
                                                          
24  See, eg, OECD Competition Committee, ‘Recommendation of the Council concerning 
Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels’ (Recommendation Report No C(98)35, OEC 
Competition Committee, 25 March 1998) < https://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
competition/2350130.pdf>; Bruce Wardhaugh, Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative 
Justification for the Criminalisation of Economic Collusion (Cambridge University Press, 
2014) 2–3. 
25  According to a recent study, there are situations in which hard-core cartels may lead to an 
increase of aggregate welfare. See Iwan Bos and Erik Pot, ‘On the Possibility of Welfare-
Enhancing Hard Core Cartels’ (2012) 107(3) Journal of Economics 199, 199. 
26  See, eg, Eleanor M Fox and Daniel A Crane, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law 
(West, 2010) 5–6.  
27  See, eg, Nicolo Zingales, ‘European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models 
Towards Convergence?’ (2008) 5(1) Competition Law Review 5, 7; Wardhaugh, above n 24, 
2. 
 
and covert conspiracies between two or more culpable participants. 28 
Investigating cartel conduct is also a very costly and resource-intensive 
task, and it can be very hard for competition authorities to successfully 
detect, gather evidence against and prosecute cartels. Leniency programs 
offer a more cost-effective means of combating cartels. The use of leniency 
programs to destabilise cartels is underpinned by the famous game theory 
of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.29 Although the situation that cartel members 
face is in fact different from that of a classical prisoner’s dilemma,30 the 
competition enforcers believe that the leniency program can serve to create 
a similar situation. The primary goal of a well-designed leniency program 
is to manipulate cartel members’ incentives to self-report and to create a 
sufficient degree of distrust among cartel members.31 Until now, it has been 
generally accepted that a well-designed leniency program must encompass 
at least the following three prerequisites: threat of severe sanctions; 
heightened fear of detection; and transparency in enforcement policies.32   
While these three prerequisites are commonly embedded in most 
jurisdictions with cartel leniency programs, the concretisation of and 
emphasis placed on each individual prerequisite differs between 
jurisdictions. For example, the EU has so far favoured larger administrative 
fines over the criminalisation of cartel conduct to strengthen the threat of 
severe sanctions,33 and focused more on the heightened-fear-of-detection 
component in its design of leniency program.34 The different emphasis 
placed on each individual prerequisite in different jurisdictions reflects 
differences in local competition culture and perceptions as to the proper 
role of competition law enforcement. It would for this reason be fallacious 
to conclude that the failure of a leniency program in one jurisdiction is due 
to the emphasis that it places on each of the three prerequisites, or that 
modelling the program in one jurisdiction on that adopted in another will 
necessarily produce the same outcomes. For instance, Australia has been 
applying criminal sanctions to cartel activities since 2009. However, one 
recent empirical study showed that the introduction of criminal sanctions 
might have adversely affected the effectiveness of the Australian immunity 
program.35 This is contrary to the situation in the US, where the use of 
criminal sanctions appears to be successful.  
                                                          
28  See, eg, Zingales, above n 27, 7; Thomas O Barnett, ‘Seven Steps to Better Cartel 
Enforcement’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition 
Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels (Hart Publishing, 2007) 141, 146. 
29  For a detailed delineation of the prisoner’s dilemma, see Christopher R Leslie, ‘Antitrust 
Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’ (2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 453, 455–
6 (‘Antitrust Amnesty’). See also Zingales, above n 27, 8–10. 
30  See Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, above n 29, 456–61. See also Zingales, above n 27, 10–11. 
31  Ibid 465–77. 
32  Scott D Hammond, ‘Cornerstones of an Effective Cartel Leniency Programme’ (2008) 4(2) 
Competition Law International 4, 5 (‘Cornerstones of an Effective Cartel Leniency 
Programme’). 
33  Ibid 6. 
34  See, eg, Zingales, above n 27, 27. 
35  See Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Immunity for Cartel Conduct: Revolution or Religion? An 
Australian Case Study’ (2014) 2(1) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126, 166 (‘Immunity for 
Cartel Conduct’). 
 
It follows that, while the three prerequisites are important for the design 
of a functioning leniency program in a theoretical sense, the more 
important issue is how to concretise them in a specific jurisdiction and 
make the three of them internally coherent and externally consistent with 
the overall enforcement of competition law and policy in that jurisdiction. 
The following section attempts to look beyond the US-EU context by 
comparing the institutional design and application of the Australian and 
Chinese immunity/leniency programs. 
III  Overview of the Australian and Chinese 
Immunity/Leniency Programs 
Considering that the Australian Immunity Program and the Chinese 
Leniency Program are at different stage of development and have different 
institutional designs, a direct comparison of the respective institutional 
settings is not possible and may even cause confusion. This Section 
therefore outlines the development of the immunity/leniency programs in 
Australia and China separately, and then elaborates on the substantive 
provisions of the two programs in order to provide a foundation for a more 
in-depth comparative analysis. 
A  The Development of the Immunity/leniency Programs in 
Australia and China 
1  Development of the Australian Cartel Immunity Program 
Like the US and the EU, Australia did not introduce a cartel leniency 
program to its competition law until relatively recently. In the course of 
doing so, two intertwined sets of policies have developed in Australia. One 
set of policies applies specifically to those involved in cartels, whereas the 
other seems to apply to other contraventions of the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘ACCA’). 36  However, the relationship 
between the two sets of policies was not clarified until the recent release of 
the ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for Cartel Conduct 2014 
(‘ACCC Immunity Policy 2014’).37 In addition, the name of the set of 
policies on cartel leniency has changed several times in the past two 
decades.  
The inception of the Australian leniency policy is said to date back to 
1998, when the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(‘ACCC’) published a guideline dealing with cooperation and leniency in 
                                                          
36  The Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘ACCA’) was previously called 
the Trade Practice Act 1974 (Cth). 
37  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’), ‘ACCC Immunity and 




enforcement.38 However, ‘plea bargaining’ between the Trade Practices 
Commission and respondents over penalties in cartel prosecution can be 
found in much earlier cases.39 The 1998 guideline dealing with cooperation 
and leniency in enforcement was not, however, a cartel leniency program 
in its current sense and was succeeded by the ACCC Cooperation Policy 
for Enforcement Matters 2002 (‘ACCC Cooperation Policy 2002’).40 The 
ACCC Cooperation Policy 2002 is still in force and applies to all 
contraventions of the ACCA. It is expressed in general terms and allows 
the ACCC to grant complete or partial immunity from action, submission 
to the court for a reduction in penalty or even administrative settlement in 
lieu of litigation.41 This means that the ACCC Cooperation Policy 2002 is 
a flexible policy and does not constitute an immunity program in the sense 
here defined. The Australian cartel immunity program in its current form 
was officially launched in June 2003, when the ACCC Leniency Policy for 
Cartel Conduct (‘ACCC Leniency Policy 2003’),42 was published. Since 
then, the ACCC immunity program and the ACCC Cooperation Policy 
2002 have both afforded a basis upon which to grant of leniency to parties 
who cooperate with the ACCC in cartel investigation and any subsequent 
litigation.43  
In the first eighteen months of its operation ten applications for leniency 
were made under the ACCC Leniency Policy 2003,44 seemingly suggesting 
that the Australian leniency policy was more effective at its inception stage 
than was the US leniency program. 45  To ensure that the operation of 
leniency policy in Australia will become a real incentive for prospective 
applicants to cooperate, the ACCC called for a review of the ACCC 
Leniency Policy 2003 and published a substantially revised policy in 2005, 
known as the ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct 2005 (‘ACCC 
Immunity Policy 2005’).46  This revised policy implemented significant 
changes. These changes were reflected in the replacement of the word 
                                                          
38  Louise Sylvan, ‘Trade Practices — New Developments in Australia’ (Speech delivered at the 
Forum of Commonwealth Agencies, 17 September 2004) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/20040917%20Commonwealth%20Agencies.pdf>. 
39  In 1981, the Federal Court of Australia approved the plea-bargaining agreement regarding the 
cartel penalties between the Trade Practices Commission and its respondents. See Trade 
Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1981) 37 ALR 256, 259. See also 
Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 392. 
40  ACCC, ‘ACCC Cooperation Policy for Enforcement Matters’ (Policy Paper, 31 July 2002) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20cooperation%20policy%20July%202002.
pdf>. 
41  Ibid 1. 
42  ACCC, ‘ACCC Leniency Policy for Cartel Conduct’ (Policy Paper, 30 June 2003). 
43  See Lythgo-Marshall, above n 22, 116.  
44  ACCC, ‘Review of the ACCC’s Leniency Policy for Cartel Conduct’ (Discussion Paper, 24 
November 2004) 5 <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Discussion%20paper%20-%20 
Review%20of%20the%20ACCC%27s%20leniency%20policy%20for%20cartel%20conduct
.pdf>. 
45  As aforementioned in Section 1, there were only 17 leniency applications from 1978 to 1993 
in the US. 
46  ACCC, ‘ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct’ (Policy Paper, 26 August 2005). 
 
‘leniency’ with ‘immunity’,47 which emulated the US model more than its 
predecessor and placed more emphasis on transparency, certainty and 
predictability throughout the enforcement process.48 
In 2009, to introduce a dual civil/criminal regime for cartel conduct,49 
a further revised ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct 2009 (‘ACCC 
Immunity Policy 2009 ’)50 was released, which was accompanied by the 
ACCC Immunity Policy Interpretation Guidelines 2009 (‘ACCC Immunity 
Interpretation Guidelines 2009 ’).51 The ACCC Immunity Policy 2009 and 
its interpretation guidelines differ from the ACCC Immunity Policy 2005, 
especially in the management of the applications for immunity from civil 
and criminal proceedings and the respective roles of, and the relationship 
between, the ACCC and the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (‘CDPP’) in the process. 52  Changes implemented by the 
ACCC Immunity Policy 2009 were primarily confined to issues relating to 
the dual civil/criminal regime in anti-cartel enforcement. However, no 
other extensive review of the Australian immunity policy has been 
undertaken since 2004.53 In the light of the need for further clarification on 
such issues as the CDPP process and the ‘clear leader’ requirement, the 
ACCC undertook a more wide-ranging review of the ACCC Immunity 
Policy 2009 in 2013.54 After more than one year of consultation, the new 
ACCC Immunity Policy 2014, supplemented by the ACCC Immunity and 
Cooperation Policy: Frequently Asked Questions 2014 (‘ACCC 
Supplementing FAQs 2014’),55 was published on 10 September 2014. This 
new policy addresses some key issues regarding the enforcement process 
and is expected to provide more incentives for self-reporting.  
2  Development of the Chinese Cartel Leniency Program 
In contrast to Australia, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (‘AML’) came into 
force with a built-in cartel leniency clause, Article 46, in 2008.56 However, 
                                                          
47  See Ky P Ewing, Competition Rules for the 21st Century: Principles from America’s 
Experience (Kluwer Law International, 2006) 586–7. 
48  See Beaton-Wells and Fisse, above n 39, 380.  
49  On 26 June 2009, the Australian Parliament passed the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel 
Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) which imposed criminal liability for cartel 
conduct. 
50  ACCC, ‘ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct’ (Policy Paper, July 2009). 
51  ACCC, ‘ACCC Immunity Policy Interpretation Guidelines’ (Policy Paper, July 2009). 
52  Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review’ 
(2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 171, 172. (‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for 
Cartel Conduct’) 
53  Ibid. 
54  On 4 May 2013, the ACCC’s Executive General Manager for Enforcement and Compliance, 
Bezzi Marcus, announced the new round review of the ACCC’s immunity policy. See ACCC, 
‘ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct’ (Policy Paper, 14 July 2009). 
<http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/guidelines/2009immunity.html> 
55  ACCC, ‘ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy: Frequently Asked Questions’ (Policy 
Paper, September 2014). 
56  «中华人民共和国反垄断法» [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(People’s Republic of China) Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 30 
August 2007. 
 
this clause sets out only the general principles regarding the self-reporting 
of cartel participants and the possible reduction of penalty or full immunity 
from punishment. Based on this general clause, it appears that China has 
launched a cartel leniency program and intends to utilise it as a tool to battle 
against cartels. It is, however, not clear what the Chinese cartel leniency 
program encompasses and how the leniency program will be enforced. 
Although the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
(‘NDRC’) and the Chinese State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (‘SAIC’) have promulgated their respective implementation 
rules to elaborate on the general principles laid down in Article 46, the 
relevant provisions are not detailed enough and in certain aspects are even 
inconsistent with each other. Clearly these shortcomings are not conducive 
to the overall effectiveness of the leniency program. In any event, since 
China has not yet implemented a stand-alone and unified policy or 
guideline on the cartel leniency program, it is necessary to review the 
development of China’s leniency program in the broader context of 
Chinese law. 
The leniency program is applicable to cartel conduct which, in China, 
is referred to as monopoly agreements. Before China’s AML was 
implemented, various different forms of monopoly agreements were 
forbidden by several statutory provisions. For example: Article 15 of the 
Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law,57 and Article 32 of the Chinese 
Tendering and Bidding Law,58 clearly state that ‘bid-rigging’ is forbidden; 
Article 14(1) of the Chinese Price Law forbids collusion between business 
operators to manipulate market price;59 and Article 52(2) of the Chinese 
Contract Law declares any malicious collusion which will damage the 
interests of the State, a collective or a third party to be void.60 The 2003 
Interim Provisions on Preventing the Acts of Price Monopoly,61 which 
have been succeeded by the Rules against Pricing-related Monopolies,62 
also identify certain specific acts that constitute price monopoly: (1) unified 
determination, maintenance or alteration of prices; (2) manipulation of 
prices through restriction of production or supply volume; (3) manipulation 
of prices in the invitation and submission of bids or in auctions; or (4) other 
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acts of price manipulation. Various provisions target the prohibition of 
cartel behaviour, but none include any provision on the lenient treatment 
of self-reporting forbidden business activities. 63  Although the current 
Chinese cartel leniency program is often regarded as a copy of the US and 
the EU cartel laws,64 the notion of providing leniency to those who confess 
to and/or cooperate with the investigating authorities in China is not new 
in Chinese law. A survey of the various criminal codes in Chinese dynastic 
time reveals that an offender was able to receive lesser punishment, 
mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment when he/she 
confessed and/or cooperated in a criminal investigation. 65  The current 
Chinese Criminal Law stipulates in its section 3 (including Article 67 and 
Article 68) that a criminal defendant who voluntarily surrenders and 
truthfully confesses his/her criminal conduct, exposes a crime committed 
by another individual, or provides significant information to support the 
investigation of other crimes may be exempted from punishment or receive 
lesser or mitigated punishment.66  
Prior to the promulgation of the AML, the provision most relevant to 
the principle of lenient treatment of a cooperating business operator who 
conducted illegal business activities was Article 27(3) of the Chinese 
Administrative Punishment Law. According to this law, an offender shall 
be given lesser or mitigated administrative penalty if he or she voluntarily 
cooperates with the investigation of any illegal conduct.67 However, the 
Chinese notion of leniency might not have resulted in the establishment of 
a cartel leniency program in China had there not also been outside influence 
and advocates from other jurisdictions in which such programs had been 
established with apparent success. Thus, the current Chinese cartel 
leniency program is perhaps best seen as being rooted in both the general 
notion of leniency in Chinese law and in the leniency or amnesty regimes 
                                                          
63  张昕竹，黄坤 [Zhang Xinzhu and Huang Kun], «”坦白从宽”在反垄断法中的应用 — 中
国垄断协议的宽大政策研究» [The Application of ‘Leniency to Confessors’ to China’s Anti-
monopoly Law: A Study of the Leniency Policy in Anti-monopoly Law] (2011) 2 山东大学
学报哲学社会科学版 Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1, 5. 
64  In general, it is often admitted that the Chinese Antimonopoly Law is conceptualized on the 
basis of both the US and the EU competition laws. See 王晓晔[Wang Xiaoye], «中华人民共
和国反垄断法详解» [Explanations of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law] (知识产权出版社
[Intellectual Property Publishing House], 2008) 9. 
65 For example, Article 38 of the Criminal Code of Tang Dynasty and Article 26 of the Criminal 
Code of Ming Dynasty provided possibilities of exemption and mitigated penalty to offenders 
who confessed or cooperated. See 钱大群，钱元凯 [Qian Daqun and Qian Yuankai] «唐律
论析» [The Analysis of the Laws of Tang Dynasty] (南京大学出版社 [Nanjing University 
Press], 1989) 111–12; 黄彰健  [Huang Zhangjian] «明代律例汇编» [The Collection of the 
Laws of Ming Dynasty] (中央研究院历史语言研究所 [Institute of History and Philology, 
Academia Sinica], 1979) 365. 
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67   «中华人民共和国行政处罚法» [Administrative Punishment Law of the People’s Republic 
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implemented in other jurisdictions (and in particular the US and the EU).68 
It was against this background that, in 2008, the general cartel leniency 
clause, Article 46 of the AML, started to take effect. In the first two years 
after AML’s introduction, the two authorities in charge of implementation 
of the leniency program, the NDRC and the SAIC, dedicated their attention 
and resources mainly to familiarising themselves with the necessary 
enforcement knowledge and issuing implementation rules in relation to 
their respective competence. To date, two sets of rules concerning the 
implementation of the AML cartel leniency clause have been issued by the 
NDRC and the SAIC, respectively: the Rules on Administrative 
Enforcement Procedures for Pricing-related Monopolies (‘NDRC 
Administrative Enforcement Procedures Rules’) 69 , the Rules of the 
Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Procedures to 
Investigate Monopoly Agreements and Abuse of Market Dominance 
(‘SAIC Procedures Rules’), 70  and the Rules of the Administration for 
Industry and Commerce on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements (‘SAIC 
Prohibition Rules’).71 Article 46 of the AML and the three implementation 
rules thus form the direct legal basis of the current Chinese cartel leniency 
program. 
B  Substantive Law of the Cartel Immunity/Leniency Programs 
in Australia and China  
1  The ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for Cartel           
Conduct 2014  
The discussion above shows that the Australian cartel immunity program 
has come of age, with more than one decade of experience in practice and 
several reviews left behind. The new ACCC Immunity Policy 2014 and its 
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supplementing FAQs showcase a high standard of policy design and 
encompass all the commonly recognised factors of a presumably effective 
immunity program.  
As to the type of conduct that leniency might be afforded in respect of, 
the ACCC Immunity Policy 2014 applies to cartel conduct in contravention 
of Division 1 of Part IV and section 45(2)72 of the ACCA, including (a) 
price fixing, (b) restricting outputs in the production and supply chain, (c) 
allocating customers, suppliers or territories, (d) bid rigging.73  
Both corporations and individuals who have engaged in cartel conduct 
may apply for immunity.74 An important change implemented in the ACCC 
Immunity Policy 2014 is the removal of the rule that a ‘clear leader’ cannot 
apply for immunity. According to the new policy, cartel participants are 
eligible for immunity application, whether they are primary contraveners 
or in ancillary capacities. 75  However, if cartel participants have ever 
coerced others to participate in the cartel, they will not be eligible for 
immunity under this policy.76 In addition, immunity cannot be afforded to 
corporations or individuals who have unilaterally attempted, without 
success, to create a cartel.77 Similarly to the previous versions of immunity 
policy,78 only the first applicant to disclose the cartel conduct is eligible for 
immunity. Such an applicant is to be automatically immunised from the 
civil proceedings initiated by the ACCC and will likely be granted 
immunity from criminal prosecution instituted by the CDPP as long as the 
conditions for immunity are satisfied.79 In the case of a corporation that is 
granted conditional immunity, derivative immunity in the same form as that 
conditional immunity is available to related corporate entities and/or 
current and former directors, officers and employees of the corporation 
who have been involved in the relevant cartel, as long as the corporation 
follows the ACCC’s investigation procedure during the immunity 
application and the related corporate entities and/or current and former 
directors, officers and employees meet the designated criteria.80   
With respect to other requirements that a cartel immunity applicant 
needs to meet so as to secure the grant of immunity, the ACCC Immunity 
Policy 2014 stipulates that the applicant must admit participation in cartel 
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conduct that may constitute a contravention or contraventions of the ACCA, 
have ceased or committed to cease its involvement in the cartel, cooperate 
as a truly corporate act, provide full, frank and truthful disclosure of the 
suspected cartel, cooperate fully and expeditiously throughout the ACCC’s 
investigation and any ensuing proceedings, and submit the application to 
the ACCC before the ACCC receives written legal advice to institute 
proceedings regarding the suspected cartel on reasonable grounds.81  
An immunity applicant satisfying all the aforementioned conditions 
will be granted conditional (civil) immunity. 82  To receive final (civil) 
immunity, the applicant must maintain confidentiality regarding its status 
as an immunity applicant and the details of the investigation and any 
ensuing proceedings, in addition to providing full, frank and truthful 
disclosure and cooperating fully and expeditiously on a continuing basis 
until the ACCC’s investigation and any ensuing proceedings conclude.83 
The ACCC may revoke immunity or conditional immunity if it suspects 
that the immunity applicant has breached conditions of immunity and the 
suspicion cannot be dispelled after an informal dialogue with, a written 
caution to, and a further letter requesting explanations to the applicant.84  
Cartel participants can also seek criminal immunity. Applications for 
either form of immunity (civil or criminal) are to be made to the ACCC, 
although the ACCC and the CDPP are in charge of granting civil immunity 
and criminal immunity, respectively. 85  To provide better certainty to 
immunity applicants, especially with respect to criminal immunity, the 
CDPP will provide a letter of comfort to the applicant upon the 
recommendation of the ACCC and in accordance with the criteria set out 
in Annexure B to the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth.86 The 
letter of comfort from the CDPP is generally provided to the immunity 
applicant at the same time as the ACCC grants the conditional civil 
immunity and states the intention of the CDPP to grant criminal immunity 
according to section 9(6D) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 
(‘DPP Act 1983’)87 to the applicant.88 Following the letter of comfort, a 
written undertaking granting criminal immunity pursuant to section 9(6d) 
of the DDP Act 1983 will be provided by the CDPP to the applicant if the 
applicant complies with the on-going obligations and conditions.89 Unless 
revoked upon the recommendation by the ACCC, the written undertaking 
granting criminal immunity will remain in place and become final. 90 
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Compared with the ACCC Immunity Policy 2009, the new policy 
implementing a two-step process for the CDPP to grant criminal immunity 
enhances transparency, certainty and predictability regarding criminal 
immunity. In particular, the letter of comfort is expected to be used to avoid 
unnecessary delay of investigations and promote the potential settlement 
of civil cases by providing more certainty to the applicant for being 
immunised from criminal prosecution in exchange of the applicant’s 
further cooperation.91  
While the exposure to domestic and/or foreign follow-on private actions 
for damages and public enforcement actions in other jurisdictions have 
always been another major concern for cartel immunity applicants, the use 
of information collected through immunity application has always been 
sensitive and regarded as crucial to the success of immunity programs.92 
Except as required by law and pursuant to sections 1555AAA, 157B and 
157C of the ACCA93, the ACCC will try its best to protect confidentiality 
of the relevant information provided by the applicant.94 However, under 
certain circumstances, especially on international matters, the ACCC may 
request a confidentiality waiver from the immunity applicant for each 
jurisdiction in which the applicant has sought or intends to seek immunity 
or leniency for the relevant cartel conduct in that jurisdiction.95 Moreover, 
the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation by the immunity applicant 
on why such a waiver cannot be provided may be deemed a failure to fulfil 
its full cooperation obligations, thus resulting in no-grant of immunity, 
revocation of immunity, or conditional immunity.96 Although the ACCC is 
supposed to impose conditions on the use of information disclosed to 
overseas competition authorities,97 what these conditions are and how well 
they will work are beyond the immunity applicant’s control.98 Therefore, 
it is arguable that the new immunity policy may in practice increase the 
immunity applicant’s concern of exposure to domestic and/or foreign 
follow-on private actions and public enforcement actions in other 
jurisdictions. This will, in turn, deter rather than incentivise immunity 
applications under the new immunity policy.  
Cartel participants who come forward after the first application and are 
not eligible for immunity, but who are nonetheless willing to cooperate 
with the ACCC’s investigation, may also be afforded lenient treatment in 
civil and/or criminal proceedings. In exceptional circumstances, full 
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immunity from ACCC-initiated civil proceedings may even be granted.99 
One question is whether the immunity granted to the first eligible applicant 
or the more lenient treatment (or full immunity from civil proceedings in 
exceptional cases) granted to those who come forward after the first 
eligible applicant to cooperate with the ACCC in its investigation is only 
applicable to those involved in cartel conduct. According to the ACCC 
Cooperation Policy 2002, corporations or individuals involved in conduct 
in contravention of the ACCA, other than cartel conduct, who cooperate 
with the ACCC’s investigation may seek leniency, including immunity, 
from the ACCC.100 Over the past 12 years, this is the first time that the 
ACCC has clearly distinguished between the jurisdictions under the ACCC 
Immunity Policy 2014 and that under the ACCC Cooperation Policy 2002 
regarding cooperation with the ACCC’s investigation in relation to conduct 
contravening the ACCA, thus providing clearer guidance to cartel 
participants in respect of immunity and/or leniency application. 
An ‘amnesty plus’ is also available to a cartel participant who is not 
eligible for immunity, but who nonetheless cooperates with the ACCC’s 
investigation of one cartel pursuant to the ACCC Immunity Policy 2014, 
and who has reported and later received conditional immunity for a second 
cartel which is independent and unrelated to the first one. Under the 
amnesty plus regime, a cartel participant may not only obtain immunity for 
the second cartel, but may also be offered a further reduction in civil and 
possibly criminal penalties for the first cartel.101 The amnesty plus regime 
clearly provides more incentives for cartel participants to come forward to 
cooperate with the ACCC, thus promoting more efficient disclosure of 
cartels. 
2  The Current Chinese Cartel Leniency Program 
As mentioned above, the current Chinese cartel leniency program consists 
of only one general clause in the AML and some implementation rules 
respectively issued by the two enforcement authorities. Article 46 of the 
AML provides the legislative foundation for China’s leniency program: 
‘where a business operator voluntarily reports the relevant information 
concerning the conclusion of monopoly agreements and provides 
important evidence to the anti-monopoly enforcement authorities, the anti-
monopoly enforcement authorities may at their discretion grant this 
operator mitigated punishment or exemption from the punishment.’ 102 
According to the AML, the Price Law and the Anti-Unfair Competition 
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Law,103 the designated anti-monopoly enforcement authorities that have 
jurisdiction over monopoly agreements are the NDRC and the SAIC.  
The types of conduct prohibited by Article 46 include the making of 
hard-core cartels among competitors as well of other monopoly agreements, 
such as vertical restraints or competitor collaborations.104 Articles 13 and 
14 of the AML list the most popular kinds of cartel conduct as monopoly 
agreements, such as price-fixing, restriction of outputs in the production 
and supply, division of markets, restriction of the purchase and 
development of new technology or new products and joint boycotting, 
etc.105 Although there have been doubts about whether bid-rigging falls 
under the Chinese leniency program,106 it is generally accepted that bid-
rigging is included, as there is a miscellaneous provision in both Article 13 
and Article 14 referring to other monopoly agreements as determined by 
the anti-monopoly enforcement authorities.107  
According to Article 46 of the AML, the subject that is eligible to apply 
for leniency refers to business operators.108 Although the term ‘business 
operator’ in the AML legal text seems to include any natural person who 
engages in the manufacture and transaction of commodities or provision of 
services, 109  it in fact does not include the ‘individuals’ under mature 
leniency programs in other jurisdictions, but rather still represents the 
meaning of a corporation. 110  This means individuals are not qualified 
leniency applicants in the current Chinese leniency program. Industry 
associations also seem to be ineligible for leniency. Although Article 46 of 
the AML stipulates the sanctions that may be imposed upon industry 
associations that organise business operators to enter into monopoly 
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agreements, the general leniency clause seems to qualify only business 
operators as potential leniency applicants.111   
As to the degree of leniency, both mitigated punishment and exemption 
from punishment are available. However, it is not clear whether self-
reporting a monopoly agreement will guarantee that a self-reporting 
business operator will receive either of the lenient treatments. Article 46 
itself does not clearly indicate under what circumstances mitigated 
punishment or exemption from punishment will be granted. Neither does 
Article 46 impose any obligation on the anti-monopoly enforcement 
authorities to grant mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment. 
The discretion to grant leniency rests with the enforcement authorities.112 
There is also no guidance as to what kind of ‘relevant information’ shall be 
submitted and what constitutes ‘important evidence’.113  Article 46 has 
therefore been criticised on the basis that it provides no transparency and 
predictability to leniency applicants. It is to be expected that the operation 
and scope of Article 46 is likely to be refined over time as further guidelines 
and rules are implemented, and some such guidelines and rules have 
already been issued by the NDRC and the SAIC.  
Responsibility for the enforcement of the AML is shared between three 
different authorities within the Chinese government. The specific 
allocation of responsibility between these authorities can be traced to their 
respective historical roles in the enforcement of Chinese law prior to the 
promulgation of the AML, and in some instances responsibility overlaps.114 
Specifically, the Ministry of Commerce (‘MOFCOM’) has sole jurisdiction 
over merger control, while the non-merger enforcement power is divided 
between the NDRC and the SAIC, with the NDRC in charge of the price-
related violations and the SAIC for the non-price-related cases.115 Under 
this division of jurisdiction, the NDRC put into effect the NDRC 
Administrative Enforcement Procedures Rules on 29 December 2010, and 
the SAIC promulgated the SAIC Procedures Rules on 26 May 2009 and 
the SAIC Prohibition Rules on 31 December 2010, all of which include 
provisions on leniency.  
Article 14 of the NDRC Administrative Enforcement Procedures Rules 
is considered the implementation rules of Article 46 with regard to leniency 
within the NDRC’s jurisdiction. It stipulates that the government price 
supervision authority (that is, the NDRC) may at its discretion grant 
mitigated punishment or exemption from the punishment to a business 
operator who voluntarily reports the relevant information concerning the 
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conclusion of price-related monopoly agreements, and who provides 
important evidence to the government price supervision authority. 116 
Except for the requirement that the business operator provide information 
concerning the conclusion of price-related monopoly agreements, Article 
14 is in essence a repetition of Article 46 of the AML. The would-be 
leniency applicant still receives no firm assurance of the grant of leniency 
even if he or she meets the requirements of the leniency program. 117 
However, and contrary to Article 46, Article 14 does clarify the kind of 
leniency treatment available to an applicant on the basis of (1) when in the 
sequence of applications, if there is more than one, the applicant self-
reported, and (2) the amount of information that he or she submitted. For 
example, Article 14(2) states that the first business operator coming 
forward to report and provide important evidence may be granted full 
exemption from punishment, the second may receive at least 50% 
reduction of the original punishment, and any subsequent reporters may 
benefit from up to 50% reduction of the original punishment. Article 14(3) 
also indicates that the ‘important evidence’ shall play a key role in proving 
the existence of the monopoly agreement.118 It is thus obvious that these 
provisions explain the requirements for the application of leniency program 
by defining what ‘important evidence’ is and providing a sliding-scale 
structure of leniency treatment in accordance with the order in which 
applications are made.119 Thus, the would-be leniency applicants may, to a 
certain extent, anticipate the consequences of their applications.120 Article 
14, however, does not go further to clarify what concrete requirements 
applicants need to meet, how the applicants shall cooperate with the 
investigation, and when a leniency application can be submitted.121 Nor are 
any other relevant provisions in this respect to be found in current NDRC 
leniency rules. What is implied in Article 14 is that ringleaders can apply 
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120  See Oded, above n 113, 157. 
121  As to the question of when an application should be lodged, it seems that leniency applications 
both before and after the initiation of cartel investigation are valid. Recently concluded cases 
by the NDRC demonstrate that leniency applications after the initiation of cartel investigation 
are accepted and regarded as valid for consideration. See, eg, « 国家发展和改革委员会免于
处罚决定书（发改办价监免（2013）4 号）» [Written Decision for Immunity from 
Administrative Penalty of National Development and Reform Commission, Fa Gai Ban Jia 
Jian Mian (2013) No4] <http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201409/t20140903_624624.html>  
accessed 17 September 2018;  «国家发展和改革委员会免除行政处罚决定书（发改办价
监免（2014）2 号）» [Written Decision for Immunity from Administrative Penalty of 
National Development and Reform Commission, Fa Gai Ban Jia Jian Chu Fa (2014) No.2] < 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201409/t20140918_626063.html>  accessed 17 September 2018.   
 
for leniency under the NDRC leniency rules, which has also been 
confirmed by the outcome of concluded cases.122 
In comparison with the NDRC Administrative Enforcement Procedures 
Rules, the two SAIC rules provide more predictability and transparency to 
would-be leniency applicants. Article 20 of the SAIC Procedures Rules 
attempts to set the scene for the SAIC leniency rules by indicating that the 
SAIC and its local offices (that is, the Administrations for Industry and 
Commerce) may at their discretion grant mitigated punishment or 
exemption from punishment to the business operator who voluntarily 
reports the collusion of monopoly agreements and provides important 
evidence which is sufficient to initiate an investigation or plays a key role 
in proving the existence of the monopoly agreement. In addition, it clearly 
states that the organisers of the monopoly agreement are excluded from 
lenient treatment, exemption from punishment, or mitigated punishment.123 
The exclusion of organisers from lenient treatment clearly distinguishes the 
SAIC leniency rules from the NDRC leniency rules. Although whether the 
‘organiser’ is identical to the ‘ringleader’ is disputable, it can be inferred 
that the ‘ringleader’ is also excluded from lenient treatment in the SAIC 
leniency rules.  
On the basis of the SAIC Procedures Rules, Articles 11, 12 and 13 of 
the SAIC Prohibition Rules go further to elaborate on Article 46 of the 
AML. Article 11 not only stipulates that the extent of leniency treatment is 
to be granted on the basis of the order in which applications are made the 
importance of the evidence provided, the circumstances of the conclusion 
and execution of the monopoly agreement, and the degree of the business 
operator’s cooperation, but also further defines ‘important evidence’ as 
evidence that is sufficient for the SAIC local offices (the Administrations 
for Industry and Commerce) to initiate an investigation or that plays a key 
role in proving the existence of the monopoly agreement, and regards the 
information of participating business operators, the scope of products 
involved, the content and forms of the monopoly agreement, and the 
information regarding the execution of the monopoly agreement as 
                                                          
122  In 2012, in the ‘Sea Sand Case’, the Guangdong Price Bureau which is the provincial 
executive entity of NDRC granted the Guangdong Baohai Sand and Stone co., Ltd.  a 50% 
reduction in its fine because it voluntarily provided important information, despite the fact 
that it was a ring-leader of that price-fixing cartel. See Xue Qiang and Yang Xixi, ‘Anti-Cartel 
Law and Enforcement in China: A Survey’ in Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass (eds), 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: The First Five Years (Kluwer Law International, 2013) 83, 92; 
王晓晔， 叶高芬 [Wang Xiaoye and Ye Gaofen], ‘ «中国竞争法律与政策实施的现状与
发展» [Status Quo and Development of the Chinese Competition Law and Policy]’ in 中国世
界贸易组织研究会竞争政策与法律专业委员会 [Commission of Competition Policy and 
Law of the China Society for WTO Studies]; «年中国竞争法律与政策研究报告» [Report 
on Competition Law and Policy of China 2013] (法律出版社 [Law Press], 2013) 72, 77–8. 
123   «工商行政管理机关查处垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位案件程序规定» [Rules of the 
Administrations for Industry and Commerce on the Procedures to Investigate Monopoly 
Agreements and Abuse of Market Dominance] (People’s Republic of China) State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, 26 May 2009, art 20. 
 
important evidence.124 This provision, in comparison with NDRC leniency 
rules, provides the leniency applicants with a clearer notion of ‘important 
evidence’ and seems to set a lower threshold as to the information expected 
from the leniency applicants. Therefore, some commentators regard it as 
being more favourable to potential leniency applicants. 125  However, 
similar to the NDRC leniency rules, several issues necessitate further 
clarification as to what concrete requirements the leniency applicants need 
to meet, how the applicants shall cooperate with the investigation and when 
the leniency applications can be submitted. 
Another highlight of the SAIC leniency rules lies in Article 12 of the 
SAIC Prohibition Rules. Article 12 clearly stipulates that the business 
operator who is the first to voluntarily report the information regarding the 
conclusion of the monopoly agreement, and provides ‘important evidence’ 
to and full cooperation with the investigation is to be granted exemption 
from punishment.126 This stipulation brings the SAIC leniency rules closer 
to the mature leniency programs in other jurisdictions and gives more 
certainty to the first leniency applicant. What remains weak in the SAIC 
leniency rules is that subsequent cooperators still remain in the uncertainty 
of the enforcement authorities’ discretion. Moreover, unlike the NDRC 
leniency rules, the SAIC leniency rules do not even limit the authorities’ 
discretion by providing a range of lenient treatments that must be awarded 
if lenient treatment is granted when the subsequent cooperators come 
forward to cooperate with the investigation.127 As China does not impose 
criminal penalties for engaging in monopoly agreements, Article 13 of the 
SAIC Prohibition Rules makes reference to Article 46 of the AML and 
confirms that the lenient treatment, be it mitigated punishment or 
exemption from punishment, refers mainly to a reduction or exemption 
from a fine.128 Thus, it would appear that no other forms of leniency are to 
be awarded under the current leniency program.  
As outlined above, it is clear that the substantive rules of the Chinese 
leniency program are still rudimentary, with only one general clause in the 
AML and a few inconsistent implementation rules. Except for the 
inconsistences reflected in the NDRC and the SAIC leniency rules and the 
ambiguity with regard to the conditions of leniency application and the 
scope of leniency, the current Chinese cartel leniency program in its 
                                                          
124  «工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定» [Rules of AIC on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
31 December 2010, art 11. 
125  See Oded, above n 113, 157. 
126  «工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定» [Rules of AIC on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
31 December 2010, art 12. 
127  «工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定» [Rules of AIC on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements] (People’s Republic of China) State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 
31 December 2010, arts 11–12. 
128  «工商行政管理机关禁止垄断协议行为的规定» [Rules of the Administrations for Industry 
and Commerce on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements] (People’s Republic of China) State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, 31 December 2010, art 13. 
 
institutional design differs markedly from many mature leniency or 
immunity programs in the world, although it seems to have exerted 
influence as incentives on the cartel participants to cooperate with the 
investigation of several recent cases.129  
The preceding analysis reveals that China may yet learn from the 
pioneers of the leniency programs, the US and the EU, to improve its 
institutional design. It may also learn from the experience of other 
jurisdictions, such as Australia, which have already implemented tailored 
versions of these leniency programs in the light of their own anti-cartel 
enforcement practices. To this end, the following section of this article 
compares China’s leniency program and Australia’s immunity program, 
and measures each against the commonly recognised notion of what 
institutional design an effective leniency program should have. 
IV  A Comparative Analysis 
As discussed above, Australia has substantially improved the design of its 
cartel immunity program, which is now more effective at combating cartels 
through such new policy designs as providing the immunity applicants with 
enhanced transparency, certainty and predictability securing civil and 
criminal immunities. China, in contrast, has only established the cartel 
leniency mechanism on the basis of one general clause and therefore lacks 
the detail of the mature leniency models. Both Australia and China have 
learned and are learning from the US and the EU. In the result, both the 
Australian immunity program and the Chinese leniency program are to 
some extent hybrids of the US and the EU leniency programs, which thus 
makes a comparison, though only to a limited extent, valuable, as such a 
comparison not only touches upon the two programs per se but also reveals 
the fact that no universal solution to cartel problems can be expected by 
one or two mature programs. This section explores the underlying logic of 
the competition law enforcement in the two countries, and then compares 
their institutional designs against the commonly recognised key factors of 
an effective leniency program.  
A  The Underlying Logic of the Two Competition Regimes 
Although neither Australian nor Chinese legislatures expressly articulate 
the underlying logic of their respective competition regimes, it appears that 
important differences exist in this regard between Australian and Chinese 
cartel laws.  
In general, two types of perception-error underpin the preferences of 
legislators and law enforcers in their law making and enforcement: (1) 
                                                          
129  See, eg, the ‘Rice Noodle Cartel Case’ in 2010 <http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/ 
201003/t20100331_338262.html>; the ‘Hainan Crystal Cartel Case in 2013 
<http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201309/t20130929_560736.html>, the ‘International LCD Panel 
Cartel Case’ in 2013 <http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201301/t20130117_523205.html>; and the 
‘Infant Formula Price-fixing Case in 2013 <http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201308/ 
t20130807_552991.html>. (Full citations unavailable).  
 
‘false positives’ (mistakenly punishing the innocent); and (2) ‘false 
negatives’ (mistakenly failing to punish the guilty).130 In competition law 
enforcement, a false positive refers to the situation where a competition 
authority incorrectly finds a pro-competitive conduct to be harmful and 
prohibits it, whereas a false negative means that a competition authority 
incorrectly regards an anti-competitive conduct as not harmful and permits 
it.  
As both false positives and false negatives will generate costs to the 
legal system and society at large, and since the absolute avoidance of both 
costs is probably impossible in the real world, legislators and law enforcers 
must choose which of these two evils is the lesser.131 The choice exercised 
will depend, in part, on the degree of confidence that legislators and law 
enforcers have in their ability to assess whether a conduct is harmful to the 
competition and whether their rulings will generate less costs to the 
society.132 When a false positive occurs, consumers will be harmed as there 
will be less competition-enhancing behaviour in the market, and company 
wrongly found guilty will suffer as it will incur the loss of profits and 
related advantages which might be obtained through the prohibited pro-
competitive conduct. When a false negative occurs, however, only 
consumers will suffer as the wrongly permitted anti-competitive conduct 
will bring profits to the company deemed not guilty at the cost of consumer 
welfare.133 The view might therefore be taken that, normatively, the costs 
of false positives are more acceptable than the costs of false negatives. 
Some have even argued that the error of false negatives can be more readily 
corrected by the market, whereas the error of false positives will not be so 
easily expunged through market processes.134 In any event, the appropriate 
‘trade-off’ between false positives and false negatives in the context of 
competition law enforcement depends largely on the belief of the 
competition authorities in the function of unfettered market to correct the 
errors generated by false positives or false negatives,135 which is further 
conditioned upon the degree of market liberalisation and the economic and 
political theories underpinning the development of competition policies.136   
                                                          
130  See, eg, A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’ 
in A Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds), Handbook of Law and Economics (Elsevier 
B V, 2007) vol 1, 403, 427–9; Frank H Easterbrook, ‘The Limits of Antitrust’ (1984) 63(1) 
Texas Law Review 1, 14–17; Fred S McChesney, ‘Easterbrook on Errors’ (2010) 6(1) Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics 11, 14–15; Christian Ahlborn and David Bailey, ‘Discounts, 
Rebates and Selective Pricing by Dominant Firms: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison’ in Philip 
Marsden (ed), Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Edward Elgar, 2006) 195, 
207.  
131  See, eg, Easterbrook, above n 130, 14–15; McChesney, above n 130, 14, 16. 
132  In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970), 370. 
133  See Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 6th ed,  
2012) 193. 
134  See Easterbrook, above n 130, 15. 
135  See Benjamin Klein and Andres V Lerner, ‘Introduction: The Economics Revolution in 
Antitrust Law’ in Benjamin Klein and Andres V Lerner (eds), Economics of Antitrust Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2008) vol 1, ix, xxxv. 
136  An interesting discussion of the differences and causes of differences in the US antitrust law 
and the EU competition law suggests that ordo-liberalism, originating from the Freiburg 
 
Although the world’s two most influential competition regimes, the US 
antitrust law and the EU competition law, are converging in many aspects, 
the response taken in these jurisdictions to the trade-off between false-
positives and false-negatives is quite different.137 The US approach has 
been to minimise the occurrence of false positives, whereas the EU 
approach has tended to be more concerned with preventing false 
negatives.138 This divergence may be traced both to the economic theories 
that underpin the epistemology of the two competition regimes, and to the 
tradition and degree of market liberalisation. More importantly, the 
different perception of error and thus to the different preferences for 
competition law enforcement approaches will surely impact on their 
respective institutional designs and the application of law in practice.    
Coming to the Australian context, it may be inferred that Australian 
competition authorities are perhaps more concerned with the occurrence of 
false positives. That inference is based not only on the influence of the US 
antitrust model on the shape and development of the Australian 
competition law over the past century,139 but also on the degree of market 
liberalisation and the general belief in market economy.140 According to 
                                                          
School of Law and Economics, and the political goal of economic integration in Europe have 
exerted far more influence on behavioural directions of the European competition law 
enforcers towards the preservation of competitive order through necessary government 
regulation. See Nicola Giocoli, ‘Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, 
the Freiburg School, and the Early Years of European Competition Policy’ (2009) 5(4) Journal 
of Competition Law & Economics 747. There is also Chinese scholarship on this topic, 
focusing on the Chinese competition policy. See, eg,李剑 [Li Jian], «中国反垄断法实施中
的体系冲突与化解» [Conflicts of the Legal Systems in the Enforcement of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law and Their Resolutions] (2014) 6 中国法学 China Legal Science 138, 146–50. 
137  John Fingleton, ‘De-Monopolising Ireland’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Antanasiu 
(eds), European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is an Abuse of a Dominant Position? 
(Hart Publishing, 2006) 53, 60. 
138  The discussions of the divergence between the US approach and the EU approach are mainly 
from the perspective of unilateral behaviour. However, it is arguable that the differences in 
attitude towards errors in competition law enforcement across the Atlantic do not limit to the 
analysis of unilateral behaviour. See, eg, Alison Jones, ‘Analysis of Agreements under US and 
EC Antitrust Law — Convergence or Divergence?’ (2006) 51(4) The Antitrust Bulletin 691, 
806; Philip Marsden and Peter Whelan, ‘Re-Examining Trans-Atlantic Similarities and 
Divergences in Substantive and Procedural Competition Law’ (2009) 10 The Sedona 
Conference Journal 1, 12; Whish and Bailey, above n 133, 194.  
139  Australian competition law was first modelled on the US Sherman Act. See, eg, Russell V 
Miller, Miller’s Australian Competition Law and Policy (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2012) 1; 
Alex Bruce, Australian Competition Law (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2013) 7; Philip Clarke, Stephen 
Corones and Julie Clarke, Competition Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2011) 9; Deborah Healey, ‘Australia’ in Mark Williams (ed), The 
Political Economy of Competition Law in Asia (Edward Elgar, 2013) 344, 352; Ray Steinwall, 
‘Tensions in the Development of Australian Competition Law’ in Ray Steinwall (ed), 25 Years 
of Australian Competition Law (Butterworths, 2000) 1, 1, 9. In addition, it has been noted that 
Australian courts have encountered a growing body of US literature on the economic theories 
of all aspects of competition regulation. See Vijaya Nagarajan, ‘Designing Learning Strategies 
for Competition Law — Finding a Place for Context and Problem Based Learning’ (2002) 
13(1) Legal Education Review 1, 6. Moreover, Australia’s anti-cartel law recently emulates 
the US model even more by introducing the criminalisation of cartels into its competition law.  
140  In fact, the current economic philosophy used by the ACCC also supports this inference. See 
Rod Sims, ‘Economic Philosophy and the ACCC’ (Speech delivered at the National Press 
 
the Economic Freedom Reports issued by the Fraser Institute and the 
Economic Freedom Index issued by the Heritage Foundation, Australia is 
one of the freest economies in the world, with a highly liberalised 
market.141 The general belief in Australia is that the market can work well 
to regulate business behaviour and government intervention is only needed 
in limited circumstances.   
In contrast with Australia, both the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law itself 
and its accompanying implementation guidelines — though based in part 
on US antitrust law — are more heavily influenced by the EU competition 
law.142 Thus, the underlying logic of Chinese competition law is inevitably 
closer to the European model than the US model. Moreover, the 
interventionist tradition of the former Chinese planned economy and the 
relatively lower level of China’s market liberalisation will certainly impact 
on the competition law enforcers’ preference when making the trade-off 
between false positives and false negatives.143 The Chinese competition 
authorities are therefore more likely to focus on avoiding false negatives 
than false positives, and may take a more active role in policing business 
behaviours in the market to this end. 
The divergence in the underlying logic of the Australian and Chinese 
competition laws surely will impact on the implementation of their 
immunity/leniency programs in practice, which also explains the 
competition law enforcers’ preference of one criteria of institutional 
designs over another in either of the two countries.  
                                                          
Club of Australia, Canberra, 27 March 2013) < https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/economic-
philosophy-the-accc-we-are-all-economic-philosophers>. 
141  According to the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Annual Report 2014, the cornerstones 
of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, 
freedom to enter and compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property from 
aggression by others. In an economically free society, the allocation of goods and resources 
relies more fully on markets rather than government spending and regulation. Since 1980, 
Australia has been mostly ranked within the top 10 countries in the world.  See James 
Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall, ‘Economic Freedom of the World: 2014 Annual 
Report’ (Annual Report, The Fraser Institute, 2014) 1, 31. The Heritage Foundation’s 2015 
Economic Freedom Index shares similar opinions on Australia’s economic freedom and the 
analysis results. See Terry Miller and Anthony B Kim, ‘2015 Index of Economic Freedom: 
Promoting Economic Opportunity and Prosperity’ (Report, The Heritage Foundation and the 
Wall Street Journal, 2015) 11, 107–8. 
142  This can be explained by the fact that China belongs to the civil law tradition. See, eg, William 
E Kovacic, ‘Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence 
or Divergence in the Future Treatment of Dominant Firms?’ (2008) 4 Competition Law 
International 8, 8–9. For a discussion of the influence of EU competition law on the institution 
of China’s AML, see Roger Van den Bergh, ‘The Economics of Competition Policy and the 
Draft of the Chinese Competition Law’ in Thomas Eger, Michael Faure and Zhang Naigen 
(eds), Economic Analysis of Law in China (Edward Elgar, 2007) 77–111.   
143  In both the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Annual Report 2014 and the Heritage 
Foundation’s 2015 Economic Freedom Index, China ranks behind 100 and belongs to mostly 
the category of ‘unfree economies’. See James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall, 
‘Economic Freedom of the World: 2014 Annual Report’ (Annual Report, The Fraser Institute, 
2014) 8; Terry Miller and Anthony B Kim, ‘2015 Index of Economic Freedom: Promoting 
Economic Opportunity and Prosperity’ (Report, The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal, 2015) 163–4. For a discussion of the extent of China’s market liberalisation and its 
impact on the belief in and reliance on the market to correct the error of false negatives, see
李剑 [Li Jian], above n 136, 146–50. 
 
B  Australian Immunity Program and Chinese Leniency 
Program through the Lens of the Commonly  
Recognised Criteria of Institutional Design 
Although the discussions above have revealed the differences in Australian 
and China’s institutional designs, a comparative analysis of these regimes 
in terms of the three commonly recognised cornerstones of an effective 
immunity/leniency program may provide a better basis for understanding 
the two programs and explaining the differences of institutional designs of 
immunity/leniency programs in different jurisdictions. 
1  Threat of Severe Sanctions  
The cartel leniency program assists competition authorities in detecting, 
prosecuting and deterring cartels. To realise these outcomes, Hammond 
argues that an effective leniency program must be accompanied by the 
threat of severe sanctions against those who participate in cartels.144 These 
sanctions must be so severe that the potential penalties cartel participants 
will incur if they are caught outweigh their potential gains from the 
cartel. 145  However, what is a sufficiently severe sanction is subject to 
debate. While some countries have embraced criminal sanctions against 
cartel conduct,146 the implementation of criminal sanctions has so far not 
proved to be universally successful in detecting and deterring cartels in 
every jurisdiction.147  Therefore, the effective threat of severe sanctions 
might not depend on whether the sanctions are criminal, civil and/or 
administrative,148 but rather on whether the institutional design in respect 
of sanctions can fit well into the whole institution of competition law 
enforcement in a particular jurisdiction and create a real deterring 
environment for cartel behaviour.  
In Australia, penalties for cartel conduct used to be limited to pecuniary 
penalties (a civil penalty regime). As the pecuniary penalties for cartel 
contraventions between 1974, when the Trade Practice Act 1974 was 
promulgated, and 1992 were considered too low to achieve the goal of 
deterring cartels, an increase in the maximum fines was called for in 
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145  Ibid 5–6. 
146  According to a report on cartel regulation, about 20 jurisdictions had adopted criminal 
penalties for cartel behaviour by the year 2010. See Kirby D Behre, Michael PA Cohen and 
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criminal sanctions on the effective enforcement of an immunity program in Australia, the 
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Furse, The Criminal Law of Competition in the UK and in the US (Edward Elgar, 2012) 1. 
148  A strong supporter for criminal cartel sanctions is Scott D Hammond, the former Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the US Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division. See Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Cartel Leniency Programme, 
above n 32, 4, 5–6. 
 
1993.149 From 1993 to 2007, the highest fines applicable to cartel conduct 
were AUD10 million for corporations and AUD 500,000 for individuals.150 
Since 2007, the maximum corporate fines associated with cartel conduct 
were changed to (1) AUD 10 million, or (2) three times the total value of 
the benefits obtained from the contravention, or (3) ten per cent of the 
annual turnover over a 12-month period if the benefits cannot be 
ascertained, and the maximum individual fines remained the same as 
before.151 Although there was a gradual increase in the pecuniary penalty 
amounts after 1993, Beaton-Wells and Fisse argue that, until 2009, the civil 
pecuniary penalty regime failed to exert a sufficiently deterrent impact on 
cartels,152 as judges seemed to be reluctant to impose penalties up to the 
allowable limit and showed sympathy to cartel participants.153 Though the 
reasons for these behaviours are likely complex, they may reflect, in part, 
the cautious approach preferred by the Australian competition law 
enforcers to avoid or minimise false positives in law enforcement (outlined 
above). To exert more deterrence on cartels, criminal cartel sanctions was 
introduced in 2009, with a maximum jail term of 10 years for individual 
offenders. While enhancing the effectiveness of the immunity program was 
an important argument for the adoption of criminal sanctions, 154  the 
empirical evidence so far does not appear to provide strong support for the 
adoption of criminal sanctions.  
According to an empirical study conducted by Beaton-Wells, since 
2009 fewer applications or intentions to apply for immunity have been 
made to the ACCC than in the years preceding the introduction of criminal 
sanctions.155 This might suggest that criminal sanctions have deterred the 
formation of cartels. However, other explanations are also possible. For 
example, a more straightforward explanation for the low numbers of 
immunity applications after 2009 might well be that the introduction of 
criminal cartel sanctions has added extra complexity to the decision-
making of (and risks faced by) potential immunity applicants. 
Notwithstanding the promise of more certainty offered by the CDPP, dual 
civil/criminal applications are to be handled by the ACCC and the CDPP 
independently, which adds uncertainty to the outcome of an immunity 
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application. 156  To solve this problem, more clarification about the co-
working relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP and more certainty 
in view of the criminal immunity — which the new ACCC Immunity 
Policy 2014, together with its ACCC Supplementing FAQs 2014, are 
designed to provide — would reinforce the role of criminal cartel sanctions 
in incentivising immunity applications. In the meantime, it must also be 
borne in mind that the civil pecuniary penalty regime has not yet assumed 
its full function.157 Indeed, setting a punitive standard of fines does not 
necessarily have the expected deterring effect on (potential) cartel 
participants if this standard is never met. In order to achieve the goal of 
deterring cartels, therefore, the punitive fines should be enforced rather 
than relaxed.  
Unlike Australia, China does not currently have a criminal cartel 
penalty regime.158 Except for the complicated situation in relation to bid-
rigging, 159  the sanctions imposed on cartel conduct are mostly of 
administrative nature,160 which, to certain extent, reflects the proactive role 
of the Chinese competition law enforcers in punishing cartels and their 
preference for false positives over false negatives. The sanctions 
concerning monopoly agreements are stipulated in Article 46 of the AML, 
according to which business operators, in addition to being ordered to cease 
the contravention, will be fined between 1 per cent and 10 per cent of the 
total turnover in the preceding year and all the illegal gains derived from 
that contravention, if the monopoly agreement has been concluded and 
implemented, will be confiscated.161 If a monopoly agreement has been 
concluded but not implemented, a fine of no more than RMB 500,000 may 
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be imposed. 162  In addition to pecuniary sanctions against business 
operators, Article 46 of the AML also provides for sanctions against 
industry associations that organise business operators in their industry to 
conclude monopoly agreements, in which case the Anti-Monopoly Law 
enforcement authorities may impose a fine of up to RMB 500,000 on the 
industry association. Alternatively, the social organisation registration 
authorities may revoke the registration of the industry association when the 
contravention is serious.163  
In comparison with Australian cartel sanctions, the Chinese cartel 
pecuniary regime distinguishes implemented monopoly agreements from 
unimplemented ones and also establishes two types of fines based on this 
distinction. Although the concept of ‘implemented monopoly agreements’ 
is not defined in the law, the language makes it clear that agreeing upon a 
prohibited monopoly agreement is culpable and may be penalised, even if 
the business operators take no action to further the said agreement. 164 
Though the maximum fine of RMB 500,000 is not especially punitive, the 
stigma of penalisation alone is likely to have a deterrent effect on the 
formation of monopoly agreements. In addition, and notwithstanding the 
lack of clarification on issues relating to the calculation of penalties, the 
fine of 1% to 10% of the total turnover resembles the level of pecuniary 
penalties under the EU regime and the Australian regime.165 Compared 
with the Australian approach of providing three fining-methods, the single 
but variable fine in Chinese law may be better in terms of cartel deterrence, 
as it provides less room for speculation and bargaining. Surely, if the 
benefits derived from cartel conduct can be accurately ascertained, the 
Australian approach of fining cartel participants with three times the 
benefits may prove to be more effective in obtaining deterring effect if the 
fine amount of three times the benefits is greater than the 10% of the 
turnover. Moreover, the Chinese cartel sanctions regime adds the 
confiscation of illegal gains derived from the cartel conduct to a fine of the 
1% to 10% of the turnover, which is believed to have an additional deterrent 
effect on (potential) cartel participants.166   
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2  Heightened Fear of Detection  
As explained above, false positives and false negatives are inevitable in the 
enforcement of cartel laws, and both kinds of errors will reduce the 
deterrent effect of those laws. Therefore, to achieve the goal of deterring 
violations, it is necessary to either expand the magnitude of sanctions or to 
raise the probability of detection to offset the negative effect of errors.167 
One measure that might therefore be taken to improve the deterrent effect 
of immunity/leniency programs is to increase the probability of cartel 
detection in order to incentivise the self-reporting of contraventions.168 The 
fear of detection is likely to be greater when competition law authorities 
have access to every possible law enforcement power and can demonstrate 
a good track record of detecting cartels.169 It is hence not only important 
that competition law enforcement authorities are well-resourced,170  but 
also that a set of coherent, technically practicable mechanisms are available 
to enforcers who are committed to do their jobs.171 
In Australia, the ACCC is given extensive investigatory powers, 
ranging from compulsory information gathering to covert surveillance.172 
Although the ACCC has a reputation as an aggressive enforcer, empirical 
studies seem to suggest otherwise,173 While the ACCC is well-resourced, 
it does not boast a good track record of detecting cartels. In terms of 
providing coherent, technically practicable institutions, the new ACCC 
Immunity Policy 2014 is generally in line with the currently alleged most 
successful model — the US leniency program. In fact, all these technical 
institutions were present in the ACCC Immunity Policy 2009. However, 
whether this set of technical institutions has played in detecting and 
deterring cartels in the past years is difficult to assess. 
The Chinese regulatory regime, in contrast, is in a rudimentary state. 
The two designated enforcement authorities, the NDRC and the SAIC, are 
generally understaffed.174 According to Article 10 of the AML, the NDRC 
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and the SAIC both have designated departments at the central-
governmental level to preside over the relevant responsibilities and 
delegated enforcement powers of their corresponding provincial-level 
authorities to take charge of law enforcement.175  According to Article 39 
of the AML, all of these enforcement authorities may take investigatory 
measures ranging from onsite inspection and interrogation of business 
executives to the seizure and detention of relevant evidence,176 which is 
generally seen as sufficient for investigation purpose. However, in 
comparison with the investigatory powers enjoyed by the ACCC, there is 
still room for China to improve in order to have a better chance to instil a 
genuine fear of detection. Certainly, through the increased number of 
investigations in the past few years, both the NDRC and the SAIC have 
gradually built their reputation as very active, if not aggressive, 
enforcers.177 Despite criticisms such as selective law enforcement,178 the 
trend of proactive enforcement is likely to help in cultivating an 
environment in which (potential) cartel participants perceive a high risk of 
detection. What remains weak in China, however, is that a coherent set of 
technical mechanisms is still absent. There are no clear additional incentive 
mechanisms such as ‘amnesty plus’ in the US leniency program, which (as 
demonstrated earlier) are likely to prevent the reporting and/or cooperating 
cartel participants from providing more information than necessary for the 
grant of penalty exemption or reduction under investigation. It is therefore 
not easy for the NDRC and the SAIC to quickly detect and prosecute 
enough cartel violations and build a good track record. 
3  Transparency in Enforcement Policies 
The third prerequisite of an effective program is said to be its transparency 
and predictability from the perspective of (potential) leniency applicants.179 
These qualities should not only be reflected in written policies (such as 
those regarding, for example, the eligibility of leniency application, the 
procedures for the application and grant of leniency, and the gradation of 
lenient treatment) — they should also be demonstrated in the form of clear 
explanations as to when and how the discretionary power of the 
enforcement authorities is allowed to be applied.180  
                                                          
175   «中华人民共和国反垄断法» [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(People’s Republic of China) Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 30 
August 2007, art 10.  
176  «中华人民共和国反垄断法» [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(People’s Republic of China) Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 30 
August 2007, art 39. 
177  Fei Deng and Yizhe Zhang, Interview with Xu Kunlin (People’s Republic of China, August 
2014) <https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/aug14_ 
xu_intrvw_7_23f.authcheckdam.pdf> 1. 
178  Michael Han and David Boyle, ‘Antitrust Enforcement: China Ups the Ante’ in Vanessa 
Yanhua Zhang (eds), Competition Policy in Asia: Essays on Recent Development 
(Competition Policy International, 2015) 30, 32. 
179  See Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Cartel Leniency Programme, above n 32, 9. 
180  Ibid 9–10. 
 
The new ACCC Immunity Policy 2014 has again made progress to 
enhance the transparency. To a certain extent, it can be readily seen as a 
transparent and predictable immunity program.181 Taking account of the 
concerns of (potential) immunity applicants about how the CDPP makes 
decisions regarding criminal immunity,182 the new policy provides more 
certainty and predictability by stipulating that a letter of comfort from the 
CDPP in relation to criminal immunity will be issued at the same time as 
the ACCC grants conditional civil immunity to the applicant. As long as 
the immunity applicant complies with stipulated on-going obligations and 
conditions, and unless revoked upon the recommendation from the ACCC, 
a written undertaking from the CDPP granting the criminal immunity will 
follow and become final.183 This two-step process reduces uncertainty in 
relation to granting criminal immunity by the CDPP and avoids 
unnecessary delay in the overall cartel investigation.  
Although concerns have been expressed about the discretionary nature 
of the immunity program in practice (such as, for example, the qualification 
of coercion as a condition for the applicant eligibility and the extent of on-
going cooperation during the investigation), those concerns appear to have 
been overstated, and did not in any event represent the overall opinion of 
the stakeholders.184 Nevertheless, the new immunity policy also improves 
the status of the ‘ringleader’, making the ‘clear leader’ eligible to apply for 
immunity so long as he or she complies with the other conditions. 185 
Another noticeable institutional improvement to provide more clarity lies 
in the clear delineation of a cartel-specific cooperation policy and the 
jurisdictional divide between the ACCC Immunity Policy 2014 and the 
ACCC Cooperation Policy 2002. Unlike the previous versions of the 
immunity policy, the ACCC Immunity Policy 2014 carves out the ACCC’s 
position on cooperation in relation to cartel conduct from the ACCC’s 
position on cooperation in relation to other conduct in contravention of the 
ACCA. Moreover, the new policy also sets out clearly defined criteria for 
the assessment of ‘later-in’ cartel participants’ cooperation in civil matters 
and provides clear guidance regarding the later-in cartel participants’ 
cooperation in criminal matters. 186  Considering the risk of follow-on 
private actions and public enforcement actions in other jurisdictions, one 
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remaining concern is the confidentiality of the information provided to the 
ACCC, because, under certain circumstances, the relevant information may 
be released to corresponding parties, and the conditions which will be set 
for the use of confidential information by the corresponding parties lies in 
the discretion of the ACCC.187  
On the other hand, the problem of ambiguity and uncertainty in the 
Chinese leniency program appears to be the biggest concern of (potential) 
leniency applicants. Not only is the broad language in the relevant 
provisions difficult to grasp, but the inconsistencies reflected in the NDRC 
and the SAIC rules regarding the implementation of Article 46 of the AML 
are likely to lead (potential) leniency applicants into confusion. Together 
with the overlaps of jurisdiction over the various types of anticompetitive 
behaviour between the NDRC and the SAIC, the current Chinese leniency 
program has been criticised for lacking even elementary transparency.188 
Consider, for example, a scenario in which a business operator participates 
in a monopoly agreement to restrict output, but which agreement in turn 
brings about a price rise in the market. What will happen to this business 
operator if he or she perceives the risk of detection and wants to cooperate 
for leniency? Considering this monopoly agreement has caused a price 
increase, this case will fall under the NDRC’s jurisdiction as price-related 
monopoly agreements lie in the hand of the NDRC. Under this 
circumstance, this business operator is eligible for leniency application. 
But the purpose of this monopoly agreement is output restriction. Therefore, 
this case may also fall under the SAIC’s jurisdiction as output-related 
monopoly agreements are controlled by the SAIC. Which enforcement 
authority should this business operator approach? Or should this business 
operator report to both the NDRC and the SAIC? If this business operator 
reports to both authorities and is the first one to come forward to both 
authorities, what can it expect with regard to the leniency treatment when 
it provides ‘important evidence’ and fully cooperates with the investigation? 
According to the SAIC rules, this business operator shall be granted 
exemption from punishment. Pursuant to the NDRC rules, however, this 
business operator may be granted exemption from punishment. 
Furthermore, the different benchmarks of ‘important evidence’ in the 
NDRC and the SAIC create uncertainty as to whether a business operator 
can expect exemption from punishment from the NDRC, even if he or she 
qualifies for the SAIC exemption. And, if the business operator is the 
organiser of the monopoly agreement, how will the NDRC and SAIC deal 
with this case? Based on the decisions of the NDRC, this business operator 
is eligible to apply for leniency. However, under SAIC jurisdiction, the 
business operator is not so eligible. Considering the broad discretion of the 
NDRC and the SAIC regarding the extent of leniency treatment, should 
this business operator come forward to report or not? This scenario clearly 
reveals the uncertainties and inconsistencies in the current Chinese 
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leniency program, which must be addressed before we can expect a really 
functioning leniency program that supports the detection, prosecution and 
deterrence of cartels. 
V  Conclusion 
The cartel immunity/leniency program has existed for over three decades. 
While the first 15 years were uneventful, the past two decades have 
witnessed the introduction of leniency programs in more than 60 
jurisdictions. This proliferation may be attributed to the perception that 
immunity/leniency programs are effective in destroying the internal trust 
between cartel participants and in inducing self-reporting for cartel 
detection and deterrence. In fact, however, while competition law 
enforcement authorities typically claim that immunity/leniency programs 
are successful, empirical studies, although still in limited scope, do not 
seem to confirm these claims. In addition, in those jurisdictions where 
immunity/leniency programs are regarded by enforcement authorities as 
beneficial to detecting and deterring cartels, no strong empirical evidence 
exists to confirm the success of the much lauded institutional design of the 
US model. From a theoretical perspective, the three cornerstones of an 
effective leniency program are important and mutually reinforcing. In 
practice, however, their respective impacts on incentivising cartel 
participants to self-report and cooperate with the investigation may differ.  
In some jurisdictions, the imposition of criminal sanctions may work 
well to create a race to the enforcement authorities. In some jurisdictions, 
however, the introduction of criminal sanctions may in fact make a 
leniency program less palatable and prompt cartel participants to be more 
vigilant and to adopt stricter internal punishment mechanisms for defection, 
thus actually stabilising existing cartels. 189  In some jurisdictions, 
administrative pecuniary penalties may well suffice in achieving a 
deterrent effect, provided penalties are high and punitive enough to 
outweigh the potential gains derived from the cartel conduct.190 Besides, 
the criminalisation of cartel enforcement also has its limitations with regard 
to its theoretical construction.191 Therefore, whether the use of criminal 
sanctions can be perceived as an appropriate threat of severe sanctions in 
the case of an effective cartel leniency program is perhaps a question of 
public cognition in different jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, like China, 
punitive pecuniary penalties combined with the ability to confiscate illegal 
gains may well be an appropriate choice. Given that China’s situation of 
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competition law enforcement is relatively complicated due to jurisdiction 
overlap a simpler mechanism of fines may be more effective to achieve the 
goal of a leniency program.  
Certainly, without a high probability of detection, strict maximum 
sanctions are unlikely to achieve the goal of deterring cartels.192 While in 
some jurisdictions, such as Australia, empirical studies seem to show that 
the consideration of the likelihood of detection does not dominate cartel 
participants’ choice of applying for immunity,193 the high probability of 
detection is valued by many jurisdictions. Not only there is a strong 
advocacy for a set of coherent institutional mechanisms within the leniency 
program to create a heightened fear of detection in the US, the EU leniency 
program is also regarded as a program focused on detection.194 In fact, the 
ACCC’s work in recent years has been to create an environment of high 
risk of detection, whether to bring its institutional design of immunity 
program in line with the US model or to increasingly showcase its success 
in destroying cartels. As to the situation in China, notwithstanding the lack 
of a coherent set of institutional mechanisms, the Chinese competition law 
enforcers have taken a proactive role in investigating and punishing cartel 
conduct in order to cultivate an environment in which there is a high risk 
of detection.195 Indeed, realistically, to cultivate a fair competitive market 
environment, corporate candour is an important factor, but it is not always 
expectable. Creating the perception of high risk of detection as an external 
pressure is more reliable than pure corporate candour for the effective use 
of leniency program in deterring cartels. 
Although the literature reflects differing views as to the effectiveness of 
severe sanctions and the fear of detection, there would appear to be 
universal support for the assurance or transparency and predictability 
throughout the enforcement process. In both the US and the EU, emphasis 
has been placed on enhancing transparency so that (potential) leniency 
applicants can really see the benefit of immunity or leniency. Although 
empirical studies in Australia seem to suggest that a certain amount of 
discretion in the hands of the competition authorities is beneficial and even 
expected by some stakeholders,196 this discretion is confined in scope and 
does not in fact deviate from the guiding principle of transparency sought 
by the ACCC. By the same token, although the current Chinese experience 
seems to provide some justification for the high amount of discretion 
enjoyed by the enforcement authorities, this argument does not have 
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enough supporters. Arguably, the most criticised features of the Chinese 
leniency program is the ambiguity and unpredictability of the leniency 
application process.197 This uncertainty and lack of transparency have even 
led some to conclude that the Chinese AML leniency provisions are more 
like an extension of the general notion of leniency of Chinese law than a 
cartel leniency program in modern sense.198 This may not be what Chinese 
competition law enforcers want to hear. In fact, although institutional 
improvements are needed, the NDRC’s recent decisions have shed light on 
its intention and willingness to establish a commonly recognised leniency 
program by referring explicitly to the relevant, though limited, leniency 
provisions when making and reasoning its penalty decisions.199 In addition, 
the NDRC’s recent public releases have also demonstrated its commitment 
to enhance the transparency and predictability in enforcing the Chinese 
AML. 200  It is therefore arguable that high levels of transparency and 
predictability throughout the enforcement process is valued not only by 
mature immunity/leniency programs but also by newly adopted ones. 
The theoretical argument for cartel leniency programs is well made in 
the existing literature. However, few studies have been undertaken as to the 
effectiveness of leniency programs in practice.201 This article demonstrates 
that the purported “orthodox” principles are, in theory, important elements 
for its design and administration. However, the linkage between the 
concretisation of these principles and the effectiveness of a leniency 
program is much more complicated. Although the Australian immunity 
program and the Chinese leniency program differ substantially in their 
institutional designs, an apple-versus-pear comparison against the 
commonly recognised features of a successful leniency program model still 
can, to a certain extent, reveal that even the homologous programs can 
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expect much different outcomes. While the two programs may share the 
same logic, they may not necessarily lead to the same or similar results in 
practice. To evaluate the effectiveness of an immunity/leniency program, 
it is important not to always attempt to test the programs against the 
“orthodox” design.  From this perspective, this apple-versus-pear 
comparison does not only make sense in fostering a better understanding 
of the immunity/leniency programs in Australia and China, but also 
providing a counter-argument against the strong advocacy for the adoption 
of the seemingly most successful US leniency model.    
 
